Does the Rise of Naturalism Mean the End of Conceptual Analysis in the Methodology of Jurisprudence?

Recently, the method of conceptual analysis as the presumed method of analytic jurisprudence has come under attack by Brian Leiter. Relying on W.V.O. Quine’s naturalized epistemology displacing analytic-synthetic distinction on truth, Leiter offered the rejection of conceptual analysis and the adoption of naturalist method committed to doing empirical research in pursuit of providing cause-effect type of explanations in law. He argues that since conceptual analysis relies on the a priori intuitions of the conceptual theorist, this method fails to deliver the universal and necessary truths it set out to deliver. In this essay, I will analyse whether the charges Leiter levels at conceptual analysis stick to it. Drawing on the works of contemporary conceptual jurisprudents, I will conclude that conceptual analysis is secure from the defects that Leiter accuses it to have. I will argue that the questions the naturalist method and the method of conceptual analysis can succeed to answer are different sorts of questions about the law; conceptual analysis does proceed on a posteriori reasoning and its arguments are best construed as necessary truths upon contingent grounds. As a result, the naturalist method fails to replace the method of conceptual analysis.