Kocabas, Ahmet Kaan

Personalised pricing has shifted from theory to scaled practice in digital markets, blurring the traditional divide between third-degree and first-degree discrimination through profiling, experimentation, interface design, and artificial intelligence. While it can expand output and fund innovation in digital markets, its opacity and targeting can enable exploitative mark-ups and selective responses to rivalry that standard effects-based tests struggle to detect. This study argues that Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, the commitments procedure, offers a proportionate, forward-looking response to many personalised pricing risks, while classic Article 102 TFEU tools should address proven predatory or excessive pricing. This study maps the mechanisms by which personalisation can undermine rivalry and consumer choice, situates the analysis within recent guidance and the Alrosa framework. Also, it explains the complementary role of market studies and sector inquiries in surfacing patterns and establishing baselines in fast-iterating, design-mediated environments. It integrates insights from behavioural economics and human-computer interaction to show how interface frictions, dark patterns, and price framing can amplify discriminatory outcomes even when underlying algorithms are ostensibly accuracy-optimised. Recognising Article 9 ' s limits, this study proposes a calibrated sequencing: swift structural and behavioural guardrails via commitments, with fallback to infringement proceedings where harm is shown or non-compliance occurs. It thus offers both a doctrinal and institutional blueprint for regulating personalised pricing that preserves efficiency-enhancing personalisation while strengthening accountability and contestability in European Union digital markets.

Evliyaoglu, Selcuk Abdullah

The authorities responsible for constitutionality auditing at the present time inspect whether some norms are contrary to the constitution therefore assume an important role in protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. It is possible that responsible authorities may occasionally criticized while carrying out this duty based on dissatisfaction of involving parties. However these criticisms may reach to levels whether to reduce the authority of constitutional courts or even abolish them since they are redundant. Within the framework of these discussions,one of the authorities responsible for constitutionality auditing, the French Constitutional Council is examined in this study as an example. As is agreed upon in French doctrine, constitutional courts and constitutional judges have important duties in terms of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms, and in France, the Constitutional Council is the competent authority. However, it was not easy for the French Constitutional Council to reach its current position. The study reveals the functional evolution of the Council in the historical process. The Council, which was described as the guardian of the executive power in the first stage, now appears as a guardian of freedom in terms of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms. As a result, even an institution designed as the guardian of the executive power, while continuing its duty in the context of constitutional judiciary, seems to have automatically assumed the duty of protecting freedoms. This situation draws attention to the necessity of constitutional jurisdiction in terms of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms.

Yasar, Ercan

Regarding the phases/stages in criminal procedure, investigation and the main trial stages come to mind. Although it is not directly mentioned in the current Code of Criminal Procedure (with code no. 5271), there is an intermediate trial phase. This phase, which allows the return of the indictment with a limited period of time, is not important for our study because it is still considered as the investigation phase in terms of our current law. Because when the irrevocability of the stages is mentioned, what is meant exclusively is the irreversibility from the main trial phase to the investigation phase. Since the intermediate trial phase is also counted as the investigation phase, we can indirectly say that it is not possible to return to the intermediate trial phase from the main trial phase. Since the legislator does not qualify a separate phase, although there is no obstacle in terms of the principle of irrevocability from phases, it is not clear whether the prosecutor can withdraw the indictment independently of the court during the intermediate trial phase; to put it more accurately, it does not seem possible since it is not foreseen in the legislation. Indeed, with the start of the main trial phase, the phase in which the prosecutor effectively acts, comes to an end, and the task of executing and managing the process passes to the court. However, in some cases, the lack of judgement conditions or the emergence of obstacles to judgement may require returning to the investigation phase or making a decision to stop and correcting the relevant deficiencies by out-of-court authorities. For this reason, in some country practises, it is possible to return to the investigation phase during and/or after the main hearing period. Because we do not have a regulation that allows this issue, in our opinion, irreparable results emerge in the main trial phase. Likewise, the recent annulment decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the accelerated proceeding also necessitates a return to the investigation phase. We have discussed this study in order to propose changes in our legislation by trying to explain within the framework of comparative law that it should be possible to return to the investigation phase in order to eliminate the injustices (problems in the context of a fair trial) that may arise in these and similar cases.

Narbay, Safak; Kiliç, Sengul Al

One of the absolute compulsory elements of the promissory note is the signature of the issuing person. Sometimes due to a legal obligation or sometimes the will of the person, the promissory note can be issued through an authorized representative. Except for the situation related to the term indirect representation, it is the represented person who is deemed to have the legal responsibilities on the promissory note as issuing the instrument if it is issued through a legal representative. Commercial companies use their will through their authorized bodies. However, the term representation cannot be mentioned when a promissory note is issued through the authorized bodies of the commercial companies. Instead, this instrument is deemed to be issued directly by the commercial company itself. The decision of the court of appeals, which constitutes the subject of our work, is related to two marks of the company stamp; one of which is located on the right bottom corner of the instrument, and the other one, which is located on the printed designated area for the guarantor. The one which is located on the right bottom corner of the instrument, is signed twice, without exceeding the mark of the stamp. In the context of this very instrument, it is decided upon that the company is the legal person who signs a surety, and the authorized representative of the company is the person who issues the instrument, regarding the fact that the printed designated area, indicating the person who performs the payment, filled with the name and surname of the authorized representative. However, the company itself should be deemed as the person who issues the instrument, even if the promissory note is signed by an authorized representative under the commercial name of the commercial company, since the signature of the person who issues the instrument is an absolute mandatory element required by the law for issuing the promissory note.